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The case for market testing our prisons
Yesterday’s report by the think-tank Reform makes the case for ‘market-testing’ all prisons in
England and Wales. The implication is that many existing public sector prisons would not be
able to compete with private sector competition, and a large number of public prisons would be
transferred into private management. Simon Bastow finds that, as an exercise in ‘thought
leadership’, the report is certainly bold and raises interesting points. But is wholesale market
testing likely? Not any time soon.
Underlying the growth of  the market f or privately-managed prisons has been an implied
threat to public sector prisons that if  they don’t perf orm, they will be tested against private sector market
alternatives, and if  f ound wanting, will be handed over to a private sector to run. Throughout the 2000s,
waves of  market- testing have been announced, ‘f ailing’ prisons identif ied, and an elaborate bureaucratic
exercise ensues to evaluate comparative ef f iciency and ef f ectiveness.
The f act of  the matter is however that up until December 2010, not one market test had resulted in the
transf er of  a public sector prison to the private sector. It is this lesser-known yet rather striking f act that
f orms the basis f or the argument in the Ref orm report. Its f our key recommendations are:
-           all prisons should be market tested, indeed only 17 out of  131 prisons have ever been subject to a
test;
-           all, regardless of  result, should be run on f ixed-term contracts so that providers are subject to
retendering every so of ten;
-           publish comparable cost and perf ormance data f or all prisons; and
-          give prisons f lexibility to negotiate their own pay and conditions locally.
Sceptics may dismiss these, particularly the f irst two, as business-as-usual f rom a right-wing oriented
think-tank. They may also snif f  a strong lobbying inf luence of  the f irms with market share. Meanwhile,
prison ref orm groups will no doubt f eel an understandable visceral opposition to the distant threat of
wholesale privatisation, the irony here being of  course that the private sector has clearly done much to
push along ref orm over the years.
Some degree of  healthy scepticism is always usef ul. But the report, in setting out the arguments in clear
(and comparatively speaking, well- researched) terms, raises some interesting points that are worth
highlighting.
For a start, it is only advocating market testing and not privatisation. Public sector prisons could submit
tenders, and perhaps even in co-operation with private or third-sector organizations. So there is room f or
innovation in all of  this. Indeed, previous market testing exercises have shown how public sector prisons
can sit on considerable amounts of  latent capacity, and when asked to pull up their institutional socks, they
are able to transf orm themselves of ten quite quickly f rom a demotivated baseline to a suddenly
transf ormed organization.
The report also provides a picture of  a more mature and well-perf orming private sector market. The market
has grown steadily over the years (see Figure below) and with that has f lowed a considerable degree of
knowhow and experience into the f irms involved. Rather than look upon this sceptically, we might accept the
analysis at f ace value as a sign of  the market operating in broadly more successf ul ways. Indeed the data
presented (the Ministry’s own data) underlines this broad shif t towards more consistent above-average
perf ormance across a range of  important areas.
The report is also right to highlight the cultural f actors that are now very much part of  the private sector
way of  running prisons. For example, in my own research (see Bastow, 2013 f orthcoming), I interviewed
many private prison contract directors and senior of f icials who had made the move f rom working previously
in public sector prisons. Many talked about experiencing the brutality and the constraints of  the public
system throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and being able to transf er this knowhow and experience into
what they see as a much more f lexible and ‘can-do’ environment.
So why scepticism about the likelihood of  such a bold move? Well, as suggested above, the history of
market testing in England and Wales does not bode well.
From the market side, the incentives f or f irms to bid f or existing public prisons have of ten not been
suf f iciently strong. Indeed, f irms would f ind it dif f icult to replicate the kinds of  regimes in archaic Victorian
local prisons that they are running in their new and purpose-built inf rastructure. And it has been a long-
running issue f or f irms that there is not a level-playing f ield in terms of  the public sector ’s greater ability to
cover comparatively more expensive public sector pensions of  staf f  transf erred to the private sector. As
one f ormer senior NOMS of f icial told me:
“Why would the private sector want to run failing prisons? They want to run good prisons, not
really bad ones. It’s all very well for the Prison Service to threaten these prisons with transfer,
but they don’t seem to realise that the private sector doesn’t want them in the state they are in
and the conditions they come with.”
On the government side, of ten the decision to introduce more extensive market testing, or indeed to decide
to transf er a prison as a result of  a test, has come down to ministerial decisions, and ministers, particularly
Labour ministers, have of ten been reluctant to take on the POA. Similarly, the senior of f icials in NOMS
making the decisions about whether ‘f ailing’ prisons have shown enough improvement to avoid being taken
to market test are the very same of f icials whose job it has been to def end the public sector against the
private challenge. These polit ical and institutional constraints on both ministers and senior of f icials are
important f actors in explaining latent internal resistance to market testing.
It is these very same polit ical constraints that are now coming to bear on the current ministerial team. Since
May 2010, the prison system has been through a wave of  radical policy reorientation involving some
important upheaval. Not least was the decision under Ken Clarke to transf er Birmingham prison to G4S in
December 2010, one of  the largest and most militant in the estate. As the report has pointed out, under
Grayling, there has been perhaps a new stage of  ‘retreat f rom competit ion’ as deals f or ‘whole prison’
contracts have been taken of f  the table. It is likely that this retreat is a ref lection of  the constraints on him
managing this on-going relationship with the POA post-Birmingham (not to mention their Lib Dem coalit ion
partners).
The government’s response has been to push f or national wage setting and selective contracting out of
ancillary and rehabilitative f unctions in prisons. It may be that there is much to gain f rom innovation and
involvement of  the private (or third) sector in these areas. One only has to spend a f ew hours in an
average public sector local prison to see that the system has managed to sustain, indeed normalize,
obsolescence and inef f iciency in many areas.
On the other hand, carving up f unctional parts of  the system and running them through new contracts has
potential to increase transaction costs and introduce new kinds of  gaming by actors involved. In the area of
rehabilitative services, f or example, giving responsibility to contractors to ‘do rehabilitation’ in prisons runs
the risk that any wider f ocus on rehabilitation across the public sector becomes diluted and seen as
something that is a contractor ’s problem rather than a central part of  the culture of  the prison as a whole.
There is complexity in all of  this that will not be easily resolved by simplistic demands f or wholesale market
testing. Clearly, it is unlikely that the prison system is no time soon going to be tested en masse – but this
should not discount innovative approaches around SLAs and contracting. Even if  a visionary Minister
wanted to have a go at the wholesale option, the polit ical and logistical constraints on her or him would be
too great. But the report is an interesting contribution to the debate. Ten years ago, it could have been
more easily dismissed. But in today’s context, the underlying rationale cannot, like it or not, be dismissed so
readily.
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